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Research Note: Interest Groups
and the Intergovernmental Implementation of Environmental
Policy in Canada and the United
States □
David R. Shock
Kennesaw State University
This research
note develops
a conceptual
framework
based on insights and key findings in much of the literature describing
the behaviors
of interest groups during
the intergovernmental
implementation
of environmental
regulatory policies in two federal political systems, Canada and the United States. Two variables identified in the
literature are used to construct the framework:
the level
of fragmentation
in a political system, and the level of
discretion possesed by subnational governments.
Combining these factors
identifies four categories
of interest
group activities , here termed bargaining,
legislative
lobbying, multiple institutional
lobbying,
and intergovernmental lobbying. The framework
is intended to serve as a
foundation
for future studies of interest groups during
the intergovernmental
implementation
of environmental
policies in North America.

I

n Canada and the United States, interest groups are important
political actors throughout the environmental policymaking
process. Interest groups identify policy problems, formulate
policy alternatives, lobby for the adoption of particular policy
alternatives, influence policy implementation, and produce and
interpret policy evaluations. Of special importance is the fact that
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interest groups play a crucial role in both promoting and obstructing policy objectives during the implementation of public
policies (e.g., Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, 1989; Sabatier
1986; Hayes 1992; and Goggin et al. 1990). Drawing on relevant
literature, I develop a conceptual framework that serves to organize our thinking about the behaviors of interest groups during the
intergovernmental implementation of environmental regulatory
policies in two federal political systems, Canada and the United
States. The framework is intended to serve as a foundation for
future studies of interest group activities during the intergovernmental implementation of environmental policies in North America. Understanding
interest group policy implementation
activities in Canada and the United States is important because
both countries are currently implementing agreements to protect
the North American environment, such as the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement (GLWQA) of 1972. 1
Both Canada and the United States have federal political systems characterized by a constitutional division of power between
a central government and subnational governments. While simi larities exist between Canada and the United States, the political
dynamics surrounding the adoption and implementation of environmental policy in these two countries are very different. In the
United States, environmental policymaking is more centralized
1

The GLWQA was signed by Ca nada and the United States in I 972 in response to pollution threats to the Great Lakes region. Both countries agreed to reduce the release of toxic
substances, such as phosphorus , into the water and to promote environmental cleanup
efforts. The international treaty was renewed and amended in 1978 and 1987. Implementation of the GLWQA in the United States is coordinated by the federal Environme ntal
Protection Agency in close cooperation with state and local governments. In Ca nada ,
implementation efforts are led by Environment Canada, the federal environmental protection agency, in conjunction with provincial governments (most notably the Province of
Ontario). A bi-national organization, the International Joint Commission, is responsible
under the GLWQA for assessing and publicly reporting both nations ' compliance with
the provisions of the agreement.
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m the national government than it is in Canada because of constitutional and other factors. The national Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution authorizes the federal government to preempt state public policies and action that are inconsistent with
federal policy objectives, while the broad interpretation of the
ommerce Clause permits the federal government to regulate
state and local government actions affecting interstate commerce. In addition , the U.S. government 's ownership of public
lands and control of natural resources gives it direct jurisdiction
over large areas of the country, including two-thirds of the western United States (Holland , 1996, 3).
While the national government in the United States is dom inant in environmental policy, an important distinguishing aspect
of Canadian federalism is the extent to which the province s hold
the reigns of environmental policymaking. There arc a numb er o f
reasons for this. First , Section 109 of the Constitution Act of
1867 grants the provinces, rather than the federal government ,
ownership of public lands and natural resource s in Canada
(Cairns , 1992, 55, 57-58). Second , the Canadian Con stitution
does not contain a national supremacy clause similar to the
American version. As a result, the federal government in Canad a
lacks the constitutional authority to use coercive tools to force
provincial compliance with national environmental objective s.
Third , the federal government in Canada is limited in enactin g
environmental laws because the Canadian Supreme Court has
interpreted narrowly the clause in the Canadian Constituti on
permitting the federal government to regulate interprovinci al
trade (Holland , 1996, 3). Finally , separati st forces in Queb c restrain the federal government in Ottawa from centrali zing regula tion of the environment.

\1 () 1, .
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PUBLIC POLICY FRAMEWORKS AND INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITY

During the post-World War II era, various scholars studied the
relationship of interest groups to the public policy process in the
United States. For instance, E. E. Schattschneider in The
Semisovereign People (l 960) argued that powerful interests seek
to limit and control conflict in order to promote the enactment
and maintenance of policies favoring a small minority in society.
Later in time, Theodore Lowi, Ripley and Franklin, and James
Q. Wilson all developed influential frameworks for understanding interest groups and the degree of conflict that occurs with
different types of public policy. Lowi (1964) studied how interest
groups react differently to distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policies. He found that policies that distribute benefits
widely to the population generate less conflict among interest
groups than regulatory policies that punish certain groups, such
as polluters, and redistributive policies that reallocate societal
resources from one group to another. Ripley and Franklin (1987)
created a related typology of public policies that divided Lowi's
regulatory policy classification into "competitive" and "protective regulatory" policy categories. According to Ripley and
Franklin (1987, 24), competitive regulatory policies, such as the
licensing of radio and television stations, "are aimed at limiting
the provision of specific goods and services to only one or a few
designated deliverers, who are chosen from a larger number of
competing potential deliverers," while protective regulatory
policies, such as environmental protection laws, "are designed to
protect the public by setting the conditions under which various
private activities can be undertaken." Conflict, bargaining , compromise, and shifting group coalitions characterize the relationships among the competing interest groups involved in protective
regulatory policymaking (Ripley and Franklin 1987, 22-23, 143144).
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Another perspective was developed by James Q. Wilson
( 1973; 1980), who found that the activities of interest group s
depend on whether the benefits and costs of a policy are conc entrated or distributed. So-cal led "concentrated benefits " refer s to a
narrow distribution of policy benefits, such as subsidies to one or
a small number of groups that clearly represent a minority in society, while "concentrated costs " refers to the distribution of the
costs of a policy , such as through income taxes , to a small num ber of people or group s. On the other hand , "distributed benefits" refer to policy benefits flowing to large groups in soc iety,
such as the mortgage interest income tax deduction , whil e "d istributed costs " refer to the policy being paid by most memb ers of
society, such as Social Security and Medicare taxes. Wilson
(1980 , 367-370) found that public policies that concentr ate the
costs of a policy tend to generate more group conflict than poli cies that force everyone to share the burden. Policies who se costs
are widely distributed , but who se benefits are narrowl y directed
toward a particular group , such as farmers , often do not create
significant conflict.
INTEREST GROUPS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
IMPLEMENTATIONIN THE U.S. AND CANADA

For some time , the activities of interest groups in policym aking in the United States were explained by the subgovernm ent
(" iron triangles ") model. This model held that public policymak ing was the result of compromise and negotiation amon g a
closed group of executi ve branch agency official s, interest
groups , and members of legislative committees and subcommi ttees (Lowi , 1964; Ripley and Franklin , 1987). More recently, the
closed subgovernrnent model has become outdated as an "advocacy explosion " occurred , which resulted in the breakin g up of
many closed iron triangles (Berry, 1997, 199-200). Heclo ( 1978)
developed the " issue network " model of policymakin g as an alVO L.
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ternative to the closed subgovemment model. The issue network
model of policymaking held that in many different policy domains, the closed "iron triangles " of the past had been replaced
with "issue networks" containing many participants and greate r
uncertainty. Notably, in the environmental policy domain , the
rise of issue networks has led to more openness in environme ntal
policymaking, as both environmental groups and business groups
began to lobby government on environmental policies .
Since many federal regulatory policies , such as environmental protection laws , are implemented at the state and local
government levels in the United States, an understanding of interest group activities at the subnational level is important. Marvel ( 1982, 28) conducted a study of state implementation of
federal occupational safety regulations and found that " [s]tate
implementors seem to be more susceptible to forces operative at
the state and local levels than federal implementors. " As a consequence , according to Marvel (1982, 28), the federal government is more likely to aggressively pursue violations than statelevel implementers . In addition , Thompson (1981 , 1147) analyzed the implementation of state Workmen's Compensation
Laws and found that labor and business group strength in a state
was very important in determining implementation outcomes.
Furthermore , Thompson and Scicchitano (1985 , 1986) found that
the stronger labor unions were in a state, the more likely federa l
Occupational Safety and Health Act laws would be implemented
effectively. Thompson and Scicchitano (1985 , 686) note that bureaucratic agencies implementing protective regulatory policies
"fa ce an adversarial milieu" where groups targeted by the policy
fight its implementation . Thompson and Scicchitano (1986 , 177179) found that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration was more aggressive toward the states during the 1970s than
during the 1980s, which the author s attribute to the election of
Ronald Reagan as U.S. President in 1980.
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Also relevant is the case study done by Hayes , ( 1992). He ex,amined the adoption and intergovernmental implementation of
the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, which brought surface mining under federal regulation for
the first time . Coal industry interests lobbied to have enforcement of the policy conducted by the Interior Department through
tht; states, while environmental groups prefened sole federal implementation of the Act through the EPA. In this case, Haye s
(1992 , 72-73) found that business interests have extensive influence on intergovernmental policy implementation becau se many
states are heavily dependent on certain industries, such as coal
and oil, for employment and development. States often avoid
aggressive implementation of federal policies to avoid driving
crucial industries to other states (Hayes 1992, 73).
With respect to Canada, the relevant literature indicates that a
c losed "e lite accommodation" model , similar to the "iron trian gle" model in the U.S., explains Canadian intergovernmental
environmental policy implementation . According to Presthu s
(1973) , the elite accommodation proces s in Canada is character ized as a closed system of consensual and cooperative policymaking, which results in a few interests dominating the poli tical
and policy processes . Building upon the work of Presthu s, Pros s
(1975, 18-19) found that the elite accommodation model in Canada resulted from two factors: (I) " ... that the policy proce ss appears to operate principally through two relatively closed
·structures , the party system and the bureaucracy , botb of which
achieve an apex in the Cabinet," and (2) "the fact that the Canadian political system is based only to a limited extent on a plural is~ic, competitive , approach to decision making. "
In addition, Pierce et al. (1992, 24) , in a study of intere t
·groups in Ontario and Michigan, found that a greater centraliza tion .of power exists in the Province of Ontario than in the State
of Michigan. In the Province of Ontario , a single governing po VO i ..
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litical party controls both the executive and legislative activities
of the provincial government, while in Michigan, authority for
environmental policymaking is spread across the governor, legislative committees, an air quality commission, and the courts
(Pierce et al. 1992, 24-25). Pierce found in interviews with interest group officials that environmental groups in Ontario tended
to focus most of their efforts on contacting top-level officials in
the ministries implementing environmental policies (167), while
Michigan groups contacted a wide range of participants in all
three branches of government and were much more likely to file
lawsuits in the courts to affect implementation than were groups
in Ontario (159-160).
Furthermore, Harrison (1996, 102) found that cooperative
bargaining between regulating agencies and polluting industries
" is the essence of the environmental regulatory process as it is
practised [sic] in Canada;" according to him, "regulatory standards as well as schedules for individual polluters to come into
compliance typically have been negotiated behind closed doors
in a tripartite process involving federal and provincial officia ls
and representatives of the polluting industry. " This closed relationship prevents groups promoting environmentally friendly
policies from having significant input during implementation
negotiations.
As a result of provincial dominance of environmental policy
implementation in Canada, dominant economic groups in different provinces potentially can veto attempts by provincial governments to adopt stricter environmental regulations. According
to Skogstad (1996, 108-109) , provinces are reluctant to enact
environmental policies that threaten their largest and most important industries, such as the oil and gas industry in Alberta, the
pulp and paper and hydroelectricity industries in Quebec, and the
forestry industry in British Columbia. As a consequence of provincial dominance in environmental policy in Canada, important
Tl
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economic interests in province s generally prevail over national
policy objectives (Skogstad 1996, 108). In the same vein, Rabe
(I 999 , 290) states that "provinces clearly are reluctant in any
way to alienate industries that might transfer investments to lessrigorous provinces. As one provincial official noted, ' the bottom
line is not environmental protection here, but economic dev elopment. "'
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

These accounts and findings suggest a framework for catego rizing interest group behaviors during the intergovernmental implementation of environmental policy in Canada and the United
States. The framework is illustrated in Table 1. Two important
TABLE]
INT EREST GRO P ACTIVITIES DURING THE INTERGOVER NME TAL
IMPLEME NTAT ION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Level of Governmental Fraementation
Level of Subnational
Government
Discretion

Low

Low

Legislative Lobbying
(al the federallevel)

High

Bargaining

-

High
Multiple Institutional
Lobbying
(at the federallevel)
Intergovernmental
Lobbying

-

factors emerge from the literature for explaining the behavior of
interest groups during the subnational implementation of federal
environmental policies. First, the literature indicate that the
level of fragmentation in a political system is important. Fragmentation is high if groups have access to multiple political institutions and actors. Second, the literature indicates that the
amount of discretion that subnational (i.e., state, provincial , and
VOL .
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local) governments possess during the intergovernmental implementation of federal environmental policies is important for understanding interest group activities during policy implementation.
Legislative Lobbying Activities. The framework indicates that
legislative lobbying activities at the federal level are likely to be
practiced by interest groups when both governmental fragmentation and subnational government discretion are minimal. In such
a situation , interest groups can be expected to focus their implementation efforts on lobbying members of the federal legislature
to rewrite provisions of law in order to directly benefit certain
groups , or to increase the discretion of implementing agencies.
Without additional discretion, subnational governments have
little ability to assist groups during the implementation process.
In addition, in a system with litter fragmentation, groups lack the
ability to use the courts and other institutions to stop or obstruct
implementation.
Bargaining Activities. When governmental fragmentation is
low and subnational government discretion is high, the framework hypothesizes that interest groups will engage in bargaining
activities primarily at the state/provincial level. This bargaining
classification reflects the dominance of the elite accommodatio n
model in Canada. Elite accommodation in Canadian environmental policy manifests itself through a closed, consensual, and
cooperative negotiation process between provincial-level officials and economic interests with few access points for interest
groups challenging the status quo. In Canada, fragmentation in
environmental policymaking is minimized due to a number of
reasons, such as provincial control of natural resources and the
unified legislative-executive functions of the federal and provincial governments (Hoberg, 2002). In addition, in Canada, t~e
provinces have significant discretion to adopt and impleme nt
environmental polices. As a result, provincial environment al
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agencies can use their significa nt discretion on environmental
policy concerns to benefit economically important provincial
industries (Skogstad 1996; Rabe 1999).
Multipl e Institutional Lobbying Activities. In a federal political system with high governmental fragmentation and low subnational government discretion , interest groups will find it in
their interest to lobby many different political actors at the federal level to influence implementation. When state agency discretion is low, it is not worthwhile for an environmental group to
focus significant efforts on a subnational agency with little discretion to write favorable rules. Rather , environmental interest
groups are better served focusing their lobbying efforts on federal institutions, such as the EPA, the Congress, and the federal
courts, to strike down or rewrite the procedures for implementation.
In the United States, interest group behavior during the intergovernmental implementation of federal environmental policie s
can fall into either the Multiple Institutional Lobbying or Intergovernmental Lobbying quadrants of the interest group behavior
typology depending on the political situation in Washington , DC.
Changes in presidential adminjstrations and party control in
Washington, DC affect the level of discretion granted to state and
local government agencies to implement federal environmental
policies . Democrats tend to favor federal agencies implementing
environmental policies, while Republicans tend to allow the
states more discretion to implement environmental policie s. Interest group behavior generally falls into the Multiple Institutional Lobbying quadrant during Democratic presidential
administrations because Democrats tend to distrust state governments more than Republican administrations with respect to
environmental protection.
Intergovernmental Lobbying Activities . Interest group behavior in the United States generally falls into this category if state
VOL.
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governments are granted considerable discretion to implement
federal environmental laws. The amount of discretion that statelevel agencies possess is determined by politics in Washington.
According to the Intergovernmental Lobbying category, if a high
level of subnational discretion and a high degree of fragmentation exist in a federal political system, interest groups will have
many access points of influence. If a group does not achieve its
desired policy objectives with a state or provincial environmental
agency, it can go to the state legislature, the federal EPA, the
Congress, and the judiciary to affect implementation. Groups can
lobby the Congress to revise legal requirements in ways that reduce state agency discretion during policy implementation. In
addition, in the United States, environmental interest groups can
file lawsuits to both stop and force implementation. The Intergovernmental Lobbying category resembles Hugh Heclo's
(1978) "issue networks" model of policymaking, which is characterized by openness, numerous participants, and multiple access points of influence. The greater number and variety of
access points that are available in th·e United States permit
American environmental groups to participate in a wider range
of activities to influence implementation outcomes than groups
in Canada enjoy.
CONCLUSION

This research note develops a framework for categorizing interest group activities during the intergovernmental implementation of environmental regulatory policies in Canada and the
United States to compliment the existing literature on the role of
interest groups in the public policy process. Understanding the
role of interest groups in Canada and the United States is important for assessing possible implementation hurdles and in predicting the future success of intergovernmental implementation
efforts to protect the North American environment. The frameT ITE J OU RNA L
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work developed in this research note provides a foundation for
conducting future bi-national studies of the role of interest
groups during the implementation of Canada-U.S. environmental
agreements, such as the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
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